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Abstract
Today, interesting and important interconnections have been made that promise
great leaps forward for innovation systems and entrepreneurial ecosystems -
especially operating at the regional or sub-national level of the space economy. Of
course, there are politics in such relationships. Most notable are those that are critical
of anything that “interferes” with market hegemony (neoliberal bias) which has
weakened commitments such as those pioneered in South Korea in the early years
of the twenty-first century, later to be followed by numerous Scandinavian policy
experiments (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) as well as austerity policy to enlarge
regional governance spaces, as in Germany and France (not to mention the
dismantling in 2010 of Anglo-regional governance in the UK). Meanwhile, however, it
can be seen that good progress in regional innovation policy and entrepreneurial
accomplishment at regional level proceeds apace. This is known as the “co-operative
bias” in contemporary political economy. Entrepreneurial ecosystems and regional
innovation systems are excellent examples of “generative growth” mechanisms
(floated in Cooke, P, Generative Growth, Knowledge Economies and Sustainable
Development: implications for Regional Foresight Policy, 2002) as a counter to
Romer-style individualistic endogenous growth theory. The paper explores the
virtues of variety against those of linearity in innovation and entrepreneurial
ecosystems in exemplary empirical instances.
Introduction
This paper presentation looks back on an effort to counterbalance the growing emer-
gence of neoliberal hegemony in regional political economy at the beginning of the
present millennium. In a paper by Cooke (2002) which existed as a guide for EU policy
makers to an alternative approach to “new growth theory” and especially that variant
that stressed “endogenous growth theory” (Romer 1990) the idea of “generative
growth” was formed. This derived from very different and equally deep theoretical
roots to those of the neoclassical perspective. Basically, it was critical of the radical
individualisn, determinism and linearity of the neoclassical perspective and preferred
an evolutionary, socially interactive and non-linear approach to political economy. Of
course, history reveals that zero attention was paid to my advice by the relevant EU
policy maker team. They followed the various Goldman Sachs, not to say Lehman
Brothers, herds like their US policy mentors had approved. This included bending over
backwards to allow US corporate high-tech technology commercialisers to retain
transfer-priced tax, health service and other public contracts, and free trade (TTIP)
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benefits to accrue to their rivalrous competitors. Most shocking was the way corporates
and the US government first warned then cowed the EU with legal threats against
“competitive advantage” in their own backyards (Myant 2015). The proposed trade
agreement would fuel concerns that, for example, sovereign UK National Health Ser-
vice trusts could come under attack from private contractors using the ISDS (investor
state dispute settlement) tribunal system. This simulates a kind of “Economic Caesar-
ism” reminiscent of appropriation rule in Roman Britain for the contemporary era of
global competitiveness by all possible means.
In reconsidering the massive growth of neoclassical ideology and the even greater growth
in malfunctioning of social relations, catastrophic effects of war, refugees and migration that
have beset the global economic space of regions, nations and broad territories, the first thing
to record has been the decline of co-operative, socially interactive and collaborative action
in economic affairs more generally from 2000–2016. This may be displaying growing signs
of decay but the power of capital’s vice-like grip on the leading institutions of the global,
bloc and national economies has continued to strengthen. Where may signs of the emer-
gence of more evolutionary, socially responsive and learning predispositions be found?
Amongst a few may be counted the continued growth, albeit not overwhelming, of collect-
ive innovation and entrepreneurship activity. Both depend significantly on knowledge
formation, exploration, examination and exploitation among “strange attractors” who are
often capable of interacting across borders (industries, sectors, clusters) to create and
innovate with different kinds of creative actors. Although they may compete, they are also
capable of collaborating to create something of commercialisable social value. Furthermore,
while narrowly-defined science, technology innovation STI patent data is carefully recorded,
the much greater contribution to innovative value from DUI "doing, using interaction"
activity is widely acknowledged to be under or even un-recorded in the same way. It is like
“dark material” in the universe, all around us but difficult to see. Entrepreneurs and innova-
tors are largely responsible for such “dark material”.
What is generative growth?
Because of their scarcity, knowledge economies thrive under globalisation. This is the mi-
lieu within which localised knowledge clusters interact with global value chains managed
by multinational corporations. It was, until recently, contested as to whether globalisation
was a meaningful concept (Hirst and Thompson 1996; Ruigrok and Van Tulder 1995;
Cooke et al. 2000; Dunning 2000). But there is now consensus that it exists and is marked
by a heightened organisational strength, extensively over the globe and intensively
through global value chains. Thus production of goods and services is more deeply inte-
grated for different stages of the value chain in a wider array of global locations than ever
before. Global value chains are increasingly embedded in local value chains or clusters.
Competitive advantage increasingly lies in firms, regions and countries coming to terms
with these new realities, intensifying their direct and indirect capabilities for knowledge-
intensive production, enhanced productivity, innovation and new firm formation that
accompany integration of local and global value chains. Generative growth feeds off these
interactions rather than being unproductively transplanted, as often occurs with ‘redis-
tributive growth’, the style of incentivised and regulated movement of jobs and capital
from locations where they were abundant to those where they were not. Theoretically it is
an evolutionary concept that moves beyond neoclassical constructs like ‘endogenous
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growth’. The latter, even with its more realistic acceptance of realities like ‘increasing
returns’ and ‘imperfect knowledge’ remains wedded to a notion of the satisficing individ-
ual consumer and a reductionism in its analysis of spatial development processes that
even one of its main progenitors admits is ‘simplistic’ (Krugman 2000).
As is by well-known after a quarter of a century of neoliberal market hegemony allied
with neoclassicism, “endogenous growth theory” holds that economic growth is primar-
ily the result of endogenous and not external forces. Quite how globalisation, let alone
financial contagion got off scot-free in that assumption is, of course, mystifying. En-
dogenous growth theory held that investment in human capital, innovation, and know-
ledge are significant contributors to economic growth. Otherwise known as “new
growth theory” this justified such often publicly-funded spatial inequities as “technology
clusters”. Furthermore the contemporary reification of science and technology
innovation (STI) as the wellspring of economic novelty treated much more common
but less elitist (Doing, Using and Interacting; DUI) “knowledge” as less pioneering, in-
ferior and less growth-inducing. As has become clear, this “world-view” is widely pre-
sented as an apology for agglomeration, increasung returns to scale and massive social
polarisation by austerity governance. Thus entrepreneurship, including Kirzner’s “entre-
preneurial discovery process” (EDP), is reified - though not as much as global corporat-
ism - as the necessary means to kick-start capitalism after the financial meltdowns of
2007–8 and afterwards.
Generative growth balances up that minority of successful STI translations of labora-
tory bench research into commercialised products and services against the majority of
incremental, recombinant and cross-cutting innovations at interfaces that typify the
day-to-day practice of both innovation and entrepreneurship. Especially, the evolution-
ary nature of generative growth takes account of individual and collective learning by
firms and among enterprise support agencies. It is interested in but critical of certain
determinisms that neoclassicists find sympathetic, like narrow, linear and “locked-in”
path dependence compared to a more Schumpeterian recombinant “path-interdepend-
ence” which captures the interactive, to some degree “unpredictable” even “lawless” cre-
ative process that often characterises innovation as a social process. In particular the
“evolutionary perspective” is dissatisfied with non-explanations for economic phenom-
ena like the effects of chance as deployed by leading figures in the linear path depend-
ence school (Arthur 1994).
Generative growth evolves towards “disruptive change” or “punctuated evolu-
tion” as described by (Schumpeter 1975). A market forms and firms imitate or
“swarm” around an innovation, usually in a knowledgeable or otherwise asset-
privileged space, as a consequence of specialised knowledge application. There
were two types of generative growth cluster in the earlier formulation of Cooke
(2002): the pure ‘Knowledge Economy’ kind, and that better referred to as ‘Know-
ledge Upgrading’. In Evolutionary Complexity (ECT) theory, these are known as
the “Adjacent Possible” and the space of “Preadaptation” (Kauffman 2008). The
former is exemplified in, say, a genomics cluster, the latter in a premium food or
design-intensive textiles cluster.
Generative growth often occurs where local and global value chains move into alignment.
The key policy demand is foresight and to be sufficiently knowledge-capable to anticipate
such alignments. This is par excellence the province of the entrepreneur, especially that of
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the entrepreneurial ecosystem, and a skill for the toolbox of the policy maker as collective
entrepreneur. For as well as positive dynamic externalitities such as early access to innova-
tions, special investment expertise and cultural assets like “swift trust” and “gift exchange”
relationships, there are non-sustainable, negative spillovers like congestion, pollution, long
working hours, tiny workspace “cubicles”, uncertain compensation, high living costs and
lengthy commuting that moderate the attractiveness of the model. However, these negatives
also leave space for the judicious “collective entrepreneur” to operate.
But before exploring the downsides of extreme generative growth, we must extend
this analysis to the question of sustainable regional development. The first critical per-
spective on this is the initial idea that sustainable development was complicit with
entrepreneurship because it is fatally undermined by its dependence on the market
mechanism above all. Therefore, even allowing for a regulatory constraint on over-
consumption of natural and other exploitable resources, there remains an incentive to
find entrepreneurial loopholes in the regulatory regime to earn profit. Moreover, ex-
ploitation of, for example, environmentally damaging resources was initially facilitated
in “sustainable development” ideology as long as enough was left for future generations
to exploit. This applied even if the future of the viability of the planet was threatened
by not leaving-for example-polluting hydrocarbons in the ground. So the benign im-
agery of sustainable development became tarnished. The rhetoric of “communality” su-
pervenes in preference to pure acumulation by “possessive individualism” over property
rights. Comparably, Lukes (1974) critiques its “methodological individualism” which is
given a radical reinterpretation by such communal entrepreneurial purpose as aspiring
to more inclusive forms of power and profitability. It is in this “generative” dimension
that the emergence of a more evolutionary approach to entrepreneurial ecosystems
gains particular interest.
In this respect, three key lessons can be learned from the “innovation systems” litera-
ture, especially that associated with regional development, for reference to both the
contrasting and competing interests of “entrepreneurial ecosystems”. These are, in no
particular order of preference, the following.
 First, innovation (after Schumpeter 1934) is inherently recombinant, drawing
inspiration from several cognitive and material sources. These “new combinations”
are inherently socially interactive in nature,
 Second, while commercial exploitation is the purpose of successful combinations,
they may nevertheless be socially useful innovations for the innovator much more
than the entrepreneur. There are many cases of altruistic innovation.
 Third, innovation is fundamentally a “learning” procedure involving networks of
innovators in “gift exchange” or “studied trust” type interactions to achieve the
“adjacent possible” or cross “structural holes” from the known to the unknown.
By contrast, entrepreneurship is less exploratory (despite Kirzner (1997) in its “entre-
preneurial discovery process” or EDP) and relies more upon successfully repeated rou-
tines. This is because of its liberal individualistic tradition; with its more evolutionary
learning mindset, entrepreneurial ecosystems thinking is likely to moderate such bias.
One important point which supports this last contention regarding interactive learn-
ing is found in the archetypal regional innovation system which also overlaps with
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recombinant platforms of an entrepreneurial ecosystem is Silicon Valley. Just a single
evolutionary concept that has occupied much thought among entrepreneurs calculating
possible futures for this space is that concerning “basic income” (Green 1983; Green
1985). A basic income is an income unconditionally granted to all on an individual
basis, without means test or work requirement. One key idea is that all citizens are
guaranteed a wage, comparable to a retired person’s state personal pension. The com-
plementary idea is to promote a simpler, cheaper welfare system and to make it easier
for unemployed people to get into the workforce. Despite its traditional provenance, re-
cent advocacy for the reform has come from entrepreneurs and “small state” neoliberals
but also other political camps than the right wing, such as the Greens and some social-
ists and feminists. Among various recent converts noted by (Fearn 2016) in a brief pro-
gress review are Canada’s province of Ontario and other governments such as
Switzerland (voting in June 2016), The Netherlands (Utrecht region) and Finland
(launching a basic income in 2016). That it is adhered to by numerous Silicon Valley
entrepreneurs is a sign both of that culture’s abhorrence of regulatory control but also
of a certain sympathy for communal action for socially useful purposes.
To conclude this sub-section, we have provided several discussion points about “genera-
tive growth”. It can be seen to have evolutionary economic geographic origins and is set
up in contrast to the unitary, atomistic and individualistic neoclassical “assumptive world”
that fuels neoliberalist, market dogma. As such, it has recombinant and distributed know-
ledge sources that feed into innovations, commercialised for market and social purposes.
A key element of its evolutionary economic geography resides in re-combinations of dif-
ferent kinds of nearby and more distant geographic proximity (Boschma and Martin
2010). These interactive characteristics express and realise advantages from social learning
compared with the more “spontaneous” and opportunistic herd-instincts first charac-
terised by Schumpeter (1934) as “swarming”. Entrepreneurship involves much imitative
“swarming” and it may be hypothesised entrepreneurial ecosystems retain that character-
istic, albeit moderated to some extent by a less individualistic form of value capture.
Innovation, notably at regional level, is frequently characterised by relatively low value
capture and, in practice many innovators vacate the origin of their discovery in a start-up
or spin-off firm accordingly. Here the skills of the other actors in the entrepreneurial “div-
ision of labour” are more highly valued for exploitation of a repetitive kind than the often
unstable creative processes associated with exploration (March 1991).
Innovation and entrepreneurship: the regional milieu and the ecosystem
To elaborate somewhat on what was just referred to as the entrepreneurial “division of
labour” it is worth reiterating that what were once summarised by Schumpeter as four
functions have by now been elaborated to at least seven, as follows.. Thus modern
entrepreneurship research recognises, apart from the innovator, more than
Schumpeter’s four roles in innovation, which were:
 the inventor, who invents a new idea;
 the entrepreneur who commercializes this new idea;
 the banker, who provides the financial resources to the entrepreneur (and bears the
risk of the innovation project);
 the manager, who takes care of the routine day-to-day corporate management.
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These roles are most often executed by different persons (Kenney 1986). Stam (2007)
goes further in his review paper on distinctive roles found to be operating around
innovation. He observed that nowadays these distinctions designate a complex-systemic
(later “ecosystemic”; Stam 2015) - process whose key actors are as follows:
1. the person who bears uncertainty (Knight 1921);
2. an innovator (Schumpeter 1934);
3. a decision maker (Casson 2003);
4. an industrial leader (Schumpeter 1934);
5. an organizer and coordinator of economic resources (Marshall 1890);
6. an arbitrageur, alert to opportunities (Kirzner 1973, 1997);
7. an allocator of resources among alternative uses (Schultz 1982).
Accordingly, when one hears the somewhat simplistic injunctions that - to grow, re-
gions should innovate – it is salutary to calculate the number and variety of skills and
expertise required to actually move a “recombinant idea” into “practical commercialisa-
tion” status. This applies even more so to injunctions such as “entrepreneurial discov-
ery.” Moreover, as implied in evolutionary complexity theory (ECT), which ponders
novelty and the nature of its embedding economic fabric (Kauffman 2008; Arthur
2009) innovation requires a clear purpose to initiate and energise such a complex pro-
ject exercise. This is discussed in the fourth main section. Without a core idea on to
which knowledge and artifacts may be brought to converge on some novel practical
and/or commercial solution or offering to the market-say “manned flight” or “mobile
communication”- there can be no innovation. The mistake is over-simplifying “entre-
preneurial events” by conceiving them as individualistic practice rather than being em-
bedded in “entrepreneurial ecosystems” of interacting and complementary capabilities
and assets (Stam 2015).
As a result of thinking through the interactive logic of key distinctive functions in the
EDP it is rapidly evident that entrepreneurship is both more complex than hitherto be-
lieved by those who conceive it as the expression of pure individualistic “outsiderdom”
and yet simultaneously in a commonsense way “washing its face” in profitability. This
introduces the (questionable) concept of the “entrepreneurial ecosystem”. Questionable,
because it proposes interactions among diverse skill-sets among enterprises, which are
carriers of institutional value rather than atomised units of profit realisation. We shall
return to this many times in what follows, tending to prefer the institutionally more ac-
curate label (enterprise ecosystem) over the individualistic one. Thus it makes more
sense to connect enterprise to the idea of an ecosystem, which (in economic terms)
consists of interacting, value-creating entities embedded in a socio-technical system
(STS) or context that sustains both.
It is meanwhile worth reflecting that entrepreneurial interactivity may display
constraints of institutional “path dependence” that can habitually and easily cross the
boundaries of legality. Enterprise ecosystems are less “privatistic” as Stam (2015) refers
to them. Thus, as an illustration, the sale by a British entrepreneur of 1,500 fake bomb
detectors at a cost to Iraq’s interior ministry of £52 million occurred during 2008 and
2009. These were subsequently revealed to have been made from a metal aerial and an
empty plastic box (“novelty golf ball finders”) and the fraudsters jailed for 10 and 7
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years. The devices cost as little as £2 to produce but were sold for as much as £15,000
each, resulting in a trade worth up to £3 m a year.
Responsible British government department administrators and their agents pro-
moted international sale of the devices, which are on record as having cost lives, des-
pite a UK government warning they were useless. Even in 2015 after the Sinai terrorist
attacks, tourists trapped in Sharm el-Sheikh continued to be victims of the Egyptian se-
curity services using the same bomb detectors that had been exposed as fake over the
previous 7 years. Naturally, this is an extreme case, but it is testimony to characteristics
of entrepreneurship that are overwhelmingly rent-seeking and exploitative. Accordingly,
they are shared to a far lesser degree than the explorative and often “disinterested” fea-
tures of innovative activity. Yet, to reiterate Stam’s (2015) observation above, the actors
involved constituted an entrepreneurial ecosystem of military businesses supported by
numerous government agencies, military engineering assessors “experts” and military
marketing professionals from overseas trade shows to foreign sales networks.
So this is, in so many ways, from fraud and corruption to multi-client incompetence,
a bad entrepreneurial ecosystem. To be as fair as possible in adjudging the potential for
benign, collective exploitation of entrepreneurial ecosystemic behaviour, the following
helps to balance up the picture. Here, a widely implemented business model involves
social enterprise for employment and skills training. The entrepreneurial aspiration
here involved building an online community of computer workers, hired from under-
employed communities. The programme trained each of them to undertake, for ex-
ample, a single language programming exercise or translating of code for a common
application program interface (API). Recombining such skilled cohorts of practised en-
trepreneurs allows them to complete a service for a client that would normally only re-
quire 1 or 2 people. Accordingly, this exploits synergies among highly micro-
specialized professionals. These reap both scope and scale advantages from divisions of
labour which may form a “virtual assembly line” allowing faster task completion, lower
service cost and higher quality standards. This scores particularly well over traditional
outsourcing by general practice knowledge workers. Incomes and job satisfaction are
higher from virtual assembly-line set-ups. This demonstrates that entrepreneurial eco-
systems can be profitable, communal, based on learning and socially benign.
Two final points round off this preliminary analysis of the entrepreneurial ecosystem
idea before a comparable exercise is conducted for the regional innovation system
model. Two things remain to be tied up at this point. First, it is patently clear from the
above discussion that entrepreneurship and innovation or their agents, entrepreneurs
and innovators, are completely different in nature, skills and outlook. This will become
even clearer in discussing the nature of innovation in the context of “novelty”, creativity
and the idea of “newness” per se. In brief, the entrepreneur is profit-driven to a far
greater degree than the innovator. The latter may be interested in profit-taking but
may equally be disinterested in or indifferent to profit and - for example - more actively
interested in awards or social respect as expressed in social or academic prizes. Venture
capitalists routinely replace, in particular, academics from management roles in scien-
tific start-ups, as a case in point. Entrepreneurial ecosystems, too, are largely driven
and governed by market relations and the profit motive. But, second, as demonstrated
in the exemplar of the “virtual assembly line” among computer entrepreneurs, such
ecosystems are capable of collective, communal or “generative growth” that is not
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simply reducible to the bare “arm’s-length exchange” of the individualistic pursuit of
profit. Accordingly, there is potential for the accumulation of social value and associ-
ated economic efficiencies and effectiveness that are superior to the traditionally hege-
monic model of individualistic “property rights” entrepreneurship.
Innovation and the regional milieu
In the following sub-section we devote attention to the more established evolutionary
economic geography architecture of “regional innovation systems” (RIS) well-rooted in
a twenty-five year pedigree of theory, empirical analysis and policy application. Cur-
rently such policy implementation became the European Union’s required methodology
(RIS3) for all regions in the EU to formulate their bids to the European Regional Devel-
opment Fund for regional economic development assistance (€185 billion 2014–2020).
For the first time since 1988 the EU programme budgetting methodology based on
budgetary quantities, while retained as a financial management tool, shifted away from
its purely procedural accounting approach to a more substantive, content-driven re-
gional innovation policy (RIP) outlook. However, such are the “assumptive” ties that
bind in Brussels that ideologically it remained wedded to a neoliberal economic EDP
(entrepreneurial discovery process) model or “chaotic conception” requiring “smart
specialisation” as its ideal regional scenario.
This overlooked at least 75 years of regional economic development research and
policy analysis which demonstrated that economic variety is superior to specialisation.
Forced to recognise this mistake by the EU’s own economic geography advisors, a new
RIS3 injunction that specialisation was to be treated as equivalent to diversification (or
variety) thus resulted in the “chaotic conception” at the heart of the EU regional
innovation strategy. Nevertheless, with its new emphasis on evolutionary economic de-
velopment processes as the rationale for spatial strategy formulation the RIS approach
marks a big step forward in the large-scale financing and policy implementation of the
regional “milieu”. Drawing attention to the importance of “regional milieu” emphasis is
drawn to GREMI a Francophone RIP and economic geography community that first
evolved the concept. It has three important elements, which build upon regional “var-
ieties of capitalism”. To summarise first, GREMI has to explain why the regional level
of activity and identity is important. This is notably because some sub-national areas
are very distinctive, culturally, democratically and even economically while others are
less so, having weak cultural markers, centralised administration and disarticulated
economic activities (neither specialised nor diversified).
One way of conceptualising this is by means of an approach to innovation govern-
ance, suitably adapted, that facilitates understanding (Dosi 1982; Freeman and Perez
1988). Overarching the two key sub-systems in this variant of milieu theory is the
“socio-technical system” (STS). A good example of macro-theorising, this is in refer-
ence to the dominant socio-economic era which, from the Industrial Revolution to the
present day, remains under the hegemony of hydrocarbons. All long waves (after
Schumpeter 1934) have been fuelled by carbonised production processes. But within
that STS, some regions innovated woollen and cotton textiles, or shipbuilding, or coal
and steel, or food processing, furniture, carpets etc. in what Marshall famously called
“industrial districts”. These are the forerunners of “regional milieux”. Each milieu has
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an economic “paradigm” in which innovations (and subsequent “entrepreneurs”) evolve,
are fashioned or designed. They may often display diversity or what is nowadays called
“related variety”. Examples of this occurred in economic history after stagecoach build-
ing mutated towards bicycle manufacture, then motor-cycle manufacture and finally
combustion engine vehicles. Often these mutations evolved in the same milieu, using
similar raw materials such as steel, rubber and later, glass. Some later became aeronaut-
ics “milieux” and modern centres of expertise in systems and software. Together,
although of different vintages, such milieux evolved over time by exploration in prox-
imity of diversity. Such interactivity (which associates with “generative growth” most
strongly) is based on synergies that derive from industrial relatedness. Together, these
contribute in major “path dependent” ways to regional variety.
Complementing such a “regional paradigm” is what in the governance literature is
known as a “regime” which in this context refers to the “regional regime”. This is an or-
ganisational structure of governance bodies such as ministries and various regional
agencies or bodies that receive funding in support of regional innovation policy. Net-
works of interaction among such RIP actors and “paradigm” actors facilitate “generative
growth” but not neoliberal competition in the same way. Such regions nevertheless
may display distinctiveness because of this. At a different strata of activity is the “insti-
tutional” level, which is more informal or less formal than the organisational structure
of the region. Here “assumptive worlds” on reputational, expectation and rules of the
game grounds mould the regional “regime” actors into something like a regional insti-
tutional culture. This also contributes to regional variety such that industrial character
may be isomorphic with regime character in comparable regions, even in different
countries. Finally, at a relatively diluted level we introduce the “conventional” level
where everyday practice outside institutional and organisational life occurs. So uses of
language, trust, exchanging favours, sharing seasonal tasks add to the “regional regime”
in the form of specific bonding or bridging capital, which also has some economic
value and further contributes to regional related variety.
It now remains to perform a comparable effort for RIS and its associated RIP to that
done regarding “entrepreneurial ecosystems”. It will be recalled that a binary good/bad
ecosystem was hypothesised and supported with data. In this case, similar forms of disarti-
culated and articulated “paradigm” and “regime” relations will be explored. One of the
most difficult RIS set-ups to deal with is one that has suffered a significant “resilience”
shock. A paradigm case of this occurred in my own territory of Wales, the RIP experience
of which was written up in Cooke et al. 2004). We can say that, if not a leading STI
innovation arena, this complex nevertheless displayed clear DUI innovation features.
Following the deindustrialisation of Wales, which culminated in the Thatcher govern-
ment’s closure of most of the coal and steel industry, some effort was made at restructuring
the economy. Before devolution in 1999, the UK government administration for Wales fash-
ioned a strategy to intensify the level of investment, both domestic and overseas, in automo-
tive and electronic engineering. By the 1990s the restructuring and downsizing of heavy
industry had evolved. Accordingly, at that time, with 5 % of the UK's population and GDP,
Wales attracted between 15 and 20 % of inward investment (FDI) in the UK (Cooke 1995).
This was not an “entrepreneurial ecosystem” but an “MNC-FDI ecosystem”, for un-
like earlier FDI it involved little elaboration of supply chains or “open innovation”. But
the influence of Asian and European FDI was different and anticipating supply chain
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formation from domestic and foreign suppliers. Thus Sony arrived in 1974, followed by
Hitachi, Panasonic (Matsushita), Aiwa, Brother, Sharp and Orion, all involved in con-
sumer or office electronics. Later, LG from Korea, wafer fabrication firms International
Rectifier (US) and Trikon (UK), and components firms from Hong Kong and Singapore
joined the cluster. With the exception of Sony, which transformed itself from a TV and
computer screen manufacturer into a leading microcomputer for code-training (Raspberry)
in the 2010s. However, Sony employs about 100 compared to 1,400 twenty tears or more
ago, while Panasonic, Hitachi, Aiwa and Brother have closed their operations in Wales and
LG from South Korea lasted only a few years. Needless to say, “open innovation” and supply
chain elaboration came to a grinding halt.
In automotive industries, Ford opened an engine plant in 1978, followed by acquisi-
tions or new, greenfield investments by Calsonic, Valeo, Lucas-SEI, Robert Bosch, Trico,
ITT-Alfred Teves, Ina Bearings, Sekisui, Yuasa, Gillet, Grundy and Hoesch-Camford.
By 1992 production of 200,000 engines a year by Toyota began as supply to their European
assembly plants. Valeo, Robert Bosch and Lucas-SEI have retreated but others have
remained and now a thriving “open innovation” set-up has recently been announced as the
new location for Aston Martin’s luxury SUV (TVR sports cars also have Wales heading
their location shortlist). Unlike electronics, automotives has proved more durable as a sup-
ply chain customer and RIP animateur. From 1999, the Ford Bridgend engine plant became
the sole Zetec engine source, producing annually 700,000 of these and 55,000 Jaguar AJ26
V8 engines. New ranges of Jaguar and Land Rover engines were frequently announced in
the 2000s, to be produced at a rate of 325,000 per year. Subsequently, when these customers
were sold to Indian MNC Tata they continued to source relevant engine technologies.
Simultaneously, Toyota engine production expanded to 500,000 engines by 2003. Formerly
deindustrialising Wales had evolved into a key centre of high-quality, high-skill automotive
engine production in Europe, with 2,400 employed at Bridgend and 600 at Deeside
in north Wales.
Two shocks occurred amidst these developments. First, much of the demand for MNC-
FDI in electronics disappeared with its importance to RIP and the RIS in engineering. Thus
losing Hitachi and Aiwa with its local suppliers association shared partly with its parent
Sony, meant its supplier links disappeared. Global-scale crisis in Asia at the turn of the mil-
lennium meant that the South Korean government enforced LG to sell Microchip assets to
Hyundai. So LG could never implement its strategy to support university research. At that
crisis time, purchase by Tata of Corus Steel meant closure of its 200-person new materials
research laboratory. Embryonic ‘Triple Helix’ relations among universities, businesses and
government agencies atrophied with the loss of regional personnel to act as intermediaries
and commissioners of research. The second shock was that large numbers of jobs were lost
even during this “second restructuring” undermining Wales’ emerging reputation by some
44,000 jobs between 1998 and 2002. This meant that a further readjustment towards a
“post-industrial” future and one based on less engineering had to be faced. One conse-
quence of this was that the European Union recognised Wales as justifying the full measure
of EU regional industrial and innovation assistance to the tune of some £3-4 billion from
2000 to 2020, a status that RIP has never managed to make significant inroads into in terms
of “high-road”, well-paid manufacturing employment. In contrast, Wales has evolved into a
“low-road”, “low-income” post-industrial retail and office-services economy. Needless to
say, demand for RIP is scarcely buoyant under such circumstances.
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RIS without RIP: innovation self-mutates
The most obvious RIS to transmute far more successfully, already by now a platform of
intersecting clusters, is Silicon Valley. This is a type of RIS that displays strong, world-
beating entrepreneurship rooted in its science and technology (STI) drivers that are pri-
marily invoked by recombinant innovation (Saxenian 1994). It is widely referred to as
an “entrepreneurial regional innovation system” (ERIS) because it doesn#t directly rely
on the kind of public RIP strategising so common in Europe and many “developmental
states” like Singapore and Taiwan, for example, in Asia (where the institutional regional
innovation system (IRIS) is more pronounced). As is well-known, only a few of the ori-
ginal Silicon Valley semiconductor fabricators from the early days still have a presence
in the core location, two of the best known being Intel and AMD. Alongside their sup-
pliers and other design rather than fabrication plants we can say the original seed crys-
tal survives. As for computer fabrication, clearly Apple, an original Cupertino locator
from the early 1970s, and many of its suppliers (though many more are now in Asia)
remain or join and - like Intel, a long-term Apple supplier - thrive and grow. Newer en-
trants, grown to giant scale, like Google and Facebook also thrive in this ICT ecosystem
and to an extent diversify in terms of related variety, notably Apple towards electric ve-
hicles (EV) and Google into electric automated vehicles (EAV).
This somewhat imitates the earlier move of former PayPal entrepreneur Elon Musk who
established the successful Tesla premium EV brand in Palo Alto in 2003. But, of course, be-
fore these mutations from ICT into EV and other renewable energy applications, Silicon
Valley had also become a favoured site in which biotechnology start-ups and spin-offs could
thrive. Accordingly, early movers, like Cetus and Genentech located in south San Francisco,
arguably close to but not right in Silicon Valley, started the earliest California biotech clus-
ter. In such science-driven (STI) innovation, proximity to the “mother-ship” in this case the
University of California Medical School, was essential. Nevertheless, venture capital from
nearby Palo Alto was also available and, in any case, the biotech funding model is different,
with a large patron like Swiss giant Hoffmann LaRoche (now Roche) being a normal fund-
ing and research partner and, since 2000, owner of Genentech, the early dedicated biotech
firm (DBF) in question. Other incumbents in the Silicon Valley biotech ecosystem have
included firms like Gilead, Amgen (HQ Los Angeles) and AbbVie (former Abbott Labs).
Though these are biopharmaceuticals firms, 40 % are in biomedical diagnostics, directly
utilising ICT advances from their advanced electronics neighbours in many cases.
Up to the present Silicon Valley ICT and - to a lesser extent - biotechnology firms
have undergone a third mutation into renewable energies, notably alternative fuels
based on algae and other types of agro-food derived combustibles. Also moves were
made - as noted - into EVs and other applications. Major green industries with a sig-
nificant presence in the state are: Solar, Wind, Biofuels, Smart Grid, Energy Storage,
Fuel Cells, Hydro, Geothermal, Green Building, Energy Efficiency, Sustainability and
Electric Cars. The top ten occupations for green jobs in California by the number of
green jobs in each occupation are: Carpenters involved in green activities filled 46,150
jobs; followed by hazardous materials removal and remediation workers at 43,470 jobs;
43,110 people were employed in green, sustainable or organic agriculture; there were
40,350 assemblers working in green manufacturing; 36,060 recycling centre operators;
24,750 electricians worked in green sector jobs; there were 23,000 plumbers, pipefitters,
and steamfitters working in green economy related jobs; 21,670 architects (excluding
Cooke Journal of Open Innovation: Technology, Market, and Complexity  (2016) 2:13 Page 11 of 19
landscape) worked in green economy related positions; 20,340 industrial production
managers found employment in green sector areas; and 19,330 construction managers
worked on green projects. Jobs also grew in the Silicon Valley (& San Francisco) smart
grid sector from 1995 to 2011. Thus between 1995 and 2011, smart grid employment
more than doubled to 17,800, up from 12,560 in 2009, and more than double the num-
ber of those jobs in 1995 (Cooke 2015).
It may briefly be concluded that Silicon Valley displays the two key modern-day
forms that combine both innovation systems and entrepreneurial ecosystems. Historic-
ally, as Saxenian (1994) shows it displayed the kind of communality, shared communi-
ties of practice and, strikingly, a dynamic transformational “platform”- like interactivity
based on recombinant innovation. In the absence of public economic governance more
typical of RIS set-ups, community action was capable of being activated by the eco-
nomic community who often co-inhabited the “silicon localities” in proximity with their
workforces from whom they recruited. Nowadays, a new wave of less benign, excess-
driven entrepreneurialism sees the San Francisco skyline changing wth luxury sky-
scrapers and infrastructure of a far more exclusive kind represented by “Google Buses”.
One of the key facilitators of this transition is the absolute social polarisation that has
occurred by the awarding of huge shares of entrepreneurial wealth to an undeserving
minorities of –“super-entrepreneurs”. Thus we may conclude that there is some sym-
metry in the conceptual and empirical vignettes that have been mobilised in support of
our thesis that innovation tends to be communal while entrepreneurship tends ultim-
ately to be individualistic and exclusive. Accordingly, while both display system or eco-
system type qualities, those associated with innovation are less inegalitarian, less
market-reifying and more attached to the disinterested pursuit of knowledge for its
own sake. This inclines innovation towards the recombinant and interactive side of the
equation while the entrepreneurial ecosystem is, in general, more imitative and profit-
motivated with a relatively lower-profile moral business posture.
Reflections on current limitations of entrepreneurial ecosystems
We have now devoted a substantial amount of thought about conceptual and empirical
matters on the subject of “entrepreneurial ecosystems”. We now propose to elaborate
on some of the key challenges faced by the emergent field, some of which show prom-
ise while others point to difficult or impossible impasses of a theoretical and, accord-
ingly, scientific nature.
We can say, with Schumpeter (1934) that he set off a contest in which there was a
clearer re-definition of novelty and “the new”. But he also deduced there that as eco-
nomics was an evolutionary science, the products of its recombinations were, in their
practical and commercial use-value, strictly indeterminate or unpredictable. This, of
course, is a major barrier to innovation. Finally, in an earlier article only published in
English in the present century (Schumpeter 1932/2005) he concluded that it was the
requirement of novelty that makes the process of innovation unpredictable, accordingly
proposing that explaining how novelty is moved from indeterminacy to determinacy
was the greatest unmet scientific challenge of his day.
It can be argued that the neo-Schumpeterian school that has made such major pro-
gress in the modern study of innovation as recombination of knowledge (including
knowledge-embedded technologies) has answered important aspects of that puzzle.
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Thus we can say with confidence that innovation has limits without being reductionist
about its circumscription. Innovation is a creative, commercially (socially) relevant and
novel recombination of old and new knowledge and technologies. “Relevance” here
denotes novelty may have to await the removal of other innovatory bottlenecks Balconi
et al. (2010). Accordingly time economies often interrupt innovation profitability: even
novel methods of “knowledge insurance” such as milestone payments and special pur-
pose vehicles (SPVs) are fashioned in recognition of the risk entailed in expectations of
future rewards. Underlying that institutional willingness on the part of public and pri-
vate innovation funding agents to execute such investment risks is what ECT theorists
of economic evolution like Kauffman (2008) refer to the “purposiveness” of innovative
action. As ECT suggests, surrounded by Lego bricks of all kinds, the innovative actor
may veer from cognitive listlessness to paralysis in the search for inspiration by clear,
purposive action. Only then are the appropriate recombinant, related varieties of know-
ledge and artifacts/technologies selected for assembly as purposive innovations. At high
levels of complexity, self-organization of innovation processes are implied where the
“global controller” used to manage the blueprint decision-making of earlier eras as de-
scribed for assembly of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) in Boisot et al. (2011).
Among the associated advances, the analysis of the value curve also now shows the
structuring of innovation value exchanged through “open innovation” in relation to the
“power laws” of intellectual capital:labour and locational ratios (Cooke 2013).
By comparison, the state of development of entrepreneurship studies seems theoretic-
ally immature. These issues of complexity and interaction have for too long been over-
looked in spatial entrepreneurship circles. The complexity dimension underestimates
the difficulties involved in conducting entrepreneurship. The interaction dimension oc-
curred traditionally by over-simplifying “entrepreneurial events” by conceiving them as
individualistic practice. But new problems arise from the improved, evolutionary per-
spective we now find being embedded in “entrepreneurial ecosystems”. Some problems
resolved in neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary economic geography of innovation con-
cerning interacting and complementary capabilities and assets remain open questions
for entrepreneurship research (Stam 2015). Among that raised by Sternberg (2007),
Malecki (2011) and Stam (2015) and others, in revaluing the ecosystem contribution to
the analysis of “high-growth start-up entrepreneurship” is overestimating the role of
STI practice in most innovation. A more nuanced recognition has emerged of high
value innovation based on “doing and using innovation” (DUI) interactive learning in
relation to cognitively but not spatially proximate regions (eg Wassermann et al. 2016).
Space constraints disallow further important conceptual distinctions that have
evolved in the analysis of how “new combinations” occur. Foremost here is Andersen
(2011) but it is also found in the entrepreneurship literature, which often closely relates
to that focused on innovation, though, as we shall see, the two are widely different. A
brief diversion on “entrepreneurship” is warranted by the heavy emphasis in EC (2012)
on promotion of the “entrepreneurial discovery process” in RIS3 strategising. In
Schumpeter (1932/2005) he “doubts the explanatory value of entrepreneurship”, suggest-
ing that theoretical advances were needed to fashion an improved theory of the social
dynamics underpinning novelty in his terms. While Andersen (2011), in recuperating
Schumpeter’s framework for analysing regional innovation, draws attention to his func-
tional differentiation of the roles of inventor, innovator, financier and entrepreneur,
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showing already at that early stage practice was already much more complex than the pro-
posed “entrepreneurial discovery process”.
Much of this comes down to the, by now, questionable “assumptive worlds” that entre-
preneurship advocates promote, Foremost among these is the still abiding adherence to
the individualistic model of pure entrepreneurship that is promulgated in entrepreneur-
ship studies. To its credit, albeit at an immature stage of theory and appropriate empirics,
this is precisely what the “entrepreneurial ecosystem” idea rails against most. At least from
this perspective the notion of “communities of practice” and functional divisions of labour
among collectivities of enterprises is privileged. However, so far there is precious little
conceptual evidence of two further elaborations needing to be adressed in the research
designs of studies into what we will resist the temptation to term “enterprise ecosystems”,
First, there is little differentiation of entrepreneurship/enterprise in terms of sector, scale
and structure in testing hypotheses about the importance of each to the specific popula-
tion under inspection. Second, there is little evident appreciation of the issue of the extent
of diversification or variety of interactions among ecosystem members as compared with
the alternative of particularistic or specialist interactions and which are of value to enter-
prise performance under what circumstances, historically or spatially (including regionally
and/or locally).
This atomized treatment of entrepreneurship as against the more non-
individualised notion of “enterprise” betrays both its intrinsic “assmptive world” but
it also acts as the source of the undifferentiated nature of the “classes” into which
firms are selected – overwhelmingly, nowadays “fast, less-fast and slow growth
entities”. This finally devolves into measurement by profitability. And this in turn
leads into measurement of entrepreneurs. In Stam’s (2015) useful parody of the
overarching rationale for entrepreneurial ecosystems, a weakness is that:
“The (entrepreneurial ecosystem) phenomenon at first appears rather tautological:
entrepreneurial ecosystems are systems that produce successful entrepreneurship
and where there is a lot of successful entrepreneurship there is apparently a good
entrepreneurial ecosystem.” (p.1764)
As a rigorous agenda for a research programme, this clearly leaves a lot to be desired.
So unlike the “enterprise ecosystem” the “entrepreneurial ecosystem” is betrayed by
its atomistic, undifferentiated (except in terms of “high-growth”) profit-motive driven
perspective into which it remains “locked-in”.
The reverse side of this characterisation is that, what Stam (2015) terms the eternal
“laundry lists” of attributes that successful entrepreneurship need to display to be
deemed successful are largely meaningless because only the winners get bestowed
with prestige. Presumably, research could show that the losers were even more as-
siduous in pursuing markets, workforce, finance, support, regulations, training and so
on than the winners. This would then lead to attempts to discover the “magic elixir”
that the winners absorbed but that the losers failed to appreciate; that way the road to
alchemy beckons: “laundry-listism” has a notorious pedigree in business studies
higher education, notably in “Change Management” MBA courses, where most rec-
ipes boil down to a kind of military “follow my leader” based on past history more
than current or anticipated crises (Cooke 2012). More than anything such thinking is
irremediably procedural and “process, process, process” ridden conservatism rather
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than paying much needed attention to substantive, content issues of entrepreneurial
“purposiveness” (Stacey 2002).
Finally, to return to Schumpeter’s concerns about the static nature of entrepreneur-
ship or, by now, preferably “enterprise ecosystems” we may contrast this with our earl-
ier and indicative suggestion of static-dynamic relationships in innovation studies, but
with a view to evoling a dynamic perspective there too. The ways in which static-
dynamic interactions have improved RIS studies, leading to enhanced RIP formulations
is exemplified in the following. Foremost is the emphasis on generative growth as dis-
cussed earlier. This is for three key reasons: first, unlike the atomistic, neoliberal per-
spective, which postulates little or no change in an equilibrium “assumptive world”
with an atomised canvas of entrepreneurs, each competing for superior profit
maximization, the entrepreneurial ecosystem appears to be the apotheosis of a static
equilibrium outcome. Generative growth, as discussed is embodied in an evolutionary
perspective, the enterprises for which are in dynamic relationships with each other as
firms, intermediaries and – crucially – “purposive actants” searching for interactive
learning opportunities by which they might communally move towards their optimal
target of profit maximization. The associated search and select mechanisms, which
engage opportunities for related variety across industry interfaces, comprise the innova-
tive inputs for the enterprise outputs that rest, accordingly, on the specific skills of the
entrepreneur, more than the innovator. Hence, a generative growth perspective entails
a dynamic, disequilibrium character expressed as the cellular motion of the restless
ecosystem as it mutates over time.
The correlate of the dynamic ecosystem in efficiency terms is the proximate nature of
the cognitive and geographical knowledge relations by which the ecosystem mutates
over time. It is not difficult to see how the structured, selected and sectoralised eco-
nomic activities that spawned the “cluster platform” typical of Silicon Valley and other
regionalised economic geographies thus emerges. In evolutionary “emergence” theory
upward and downward motion circumscribe the limiting possibilities of currently avail-
able knowledge and technologies (Cooke 2013). Not only feasible “related variety”
among clusters but unanticipated “revealed related variety” also captures the dynamism
proferred by cognitive and geographical proximity. Hence semicomductors spawned
microprocessors, interacting with personal and other computers along with related
software and systems. Then, crossovers from ICT at industry interfaces with biotech-
nology began to structure not one but two sub-clusters, followed by a third in medical
technology (further utilising ICT applications) followed by a fourth in “clean technol-
ogy” ranging from “smart grids” to “driverless vehicles”. One could probably map such
“cluster platforms” in financial districts such as New York and London. The spatiality
of such dynamic ecosystem interactions is fundamental to its cognitive and distributed
innovativeness, creativity and opportunity for communal/collective enterprise.
Discussion and Conclusions
We have reached the three main discussion points of the foregoing analysis, as a prel-
ude to the three concluding points to which they are related. The first of these opens
up a more holistic, integrated and communal mode of institutional economic practice.
This privileges – to an extent – the individualistic profit-seeking entrepreneur, though
it prefers the more neutral and various characteristics of the enterprise as the vehicle
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for value analysis and realisation. This correlates with the notion of “generative
growth”, a more evolutionary, communal and socially interactive learning process than
the narrower theory of endogenous growth,. This is reductionist as well as individualis-
tic and determined by its main focus on the profit motive par excellence. However “en-
dogenous growth” is no greater insurance than “off the shelf” technology purchase,
which is largely at the whim of the entrepreneur’s risk judgement. By contrast, “genera-
tive growth” collectively exploits the strength in numbers that a more disinterested
mode of business practice, gaining from “club goods” and “risk spreading” as described
for classic Marshallian industrial districts. This resonates with the more communal,
interactive learning disposition of regional innovation systems. These are even more
disinterested in their innovations than entrepreneurs are in their profits. This is
because they are driven by a problem-solving or discovery methodology that may not,
even in the long-run, dependent upon context, reach profitability. To survive, they may
have to construct new business models that have the character of “knowledge insur-
ance” strategies (eg biotechnology start-ups; at a corporate scale, price-fixing by the
state performs a comparable function towards nuclear energy generation). Just as entre-
preneurial/enterprise ecosystems and regional innovation systems may have good and
bad exemplars of acceptable practice. That associated with entrepreneurial ecosystems
is much closer to the market in purpose, where for innovation systems sub-optimal
performance is inclined to act “with good will” but be betrayed by “asymmetric infor-
mation”, adverse selection” or “market failure” issues that may blow policy off course
(Stam 2015).
The second discussion point is the extent to which the enterprise ecosystem has yet
developed, conceptually, let alone in terms of real practice, capabilities in relation to
one of the key concepts in this paper, as expressed in its title, namely to develop a
research methodology to handle diversity or, specifically, in the context of this paper
“related variety” (including “revealed related variety”). This would entail multiple re-
search designs, themselves diverse, to trace enterprise mutations or enterprise biog-
raphies that reveal themselves not as undifferentiated profit taking enterprises but
purposive economic entities. These would construct their purposive actions in relation
to other enterprises that facilitated the achievement of the higher purpose, such as the
(LED) lightbulb, the smartphone or the prosthetic hip or knee joint. There is relatively
little of this “ancestry analysis” by comparison with the volumes of studies of “the
world’s oldest firm” in entrepreneurship studies. There may be some risk attached to
formulating “industry interface” or “cross-over” inter- sector or inter-cluster studies but
from an innovation standpoint much innovation has this “related variety” character in-
cluding “revealed” value occurring by accident as much as design. However it is the
purposiveness that justifies the risk for search and selection potential.
And as a final discussion point, in regard to our discussion of statics and dynamics in
relation to enterprise ecosystems. It seems likely that the more evolutionary ecosystem
perspective may, if tackled and solved methodologically, assist the emergence of a more
dynamic profiling of enterprise management if not entrepreneurship in itself. Static
equilibrium and making safe bets by the inclination to imitate or “swarm” in
Schumpeterian terms rather than engage in true risk-taking practice by backing
purposive innovation for social value is holding back study in the field. Armed
with the creativity implicit in cross-over and other kinds of entrepreneurial/
Cooke Journal of Open Innovation: Technology, Market, and Complexity  (2016) 2:13 Page 16 of 19
enterprise discovery (EDP) enterprise becomes more dynamic because embedded in
emergent and evolving ecosystems. These are structured where feasible into
cluster-platforms that celebrate their revealed related variety, for example engaging
oil companies in conversations with food firms over biofuel energy, or watch-
makers and combustion engine producers finding joint new markets and seat fabric
users of nanotechnology to evolve new materials for antiseptic medical uniforms.
The creative enterprise will be alive to such (unpredictable) revealed related variety
outcomes because it celebrates dynamic change.
In terms of main conclusions, one of the strongest, theoretically and in analytical
practice is that if entrepreneurship is difficult and enterprise management is circum-
scribed by the problem of “satisficing” and “bounded rationality,” enterprise ecosystems
are advantaged by their networking propensity, their regional “communities of practice”
and the free goods of interactive learning from ecosystem peers whether firms ot inter-
mediaries. Thus although it is an immature field, arising from “booster practice” rather
than well-argued researcher discovery and real-world practical observation, it has
worthwhile potential for becoming a dynamic contributor to theory and policy. Import-
antly, it is by now clear that entrepreneurship is different in nature and kind from in-
novative activity. But it is also clear that much effort conducted in enterprise
ecosystems will be less than high growth firm performance based on hitting the STI
jackpot. Rather it will be solid, necessary, problem-solving along the more normal DUI
innovation routeways which account for the greater part of social value arising from
the enerprise ecosystem setting.
Second, one of the insights of evolutionary complexity theory (ECT) that has
performed a useful role in enterprise ecosystem theory has been that offered by
Kauffman (2008) regarding the rate of evolution of novelty (innovation or creative
artifact or service) is that as the economic fabric of the ecosystems within which
they are embedded themselves evolve and become more complex in terms of their
power laws of scale and scope, the greater is the opportunity for further, accelerat-
ing novelty, including that of enterprises. This connects back to our reference to
what once seemed a utopian idea which - as a by-product - could cause a huge re-
lease of social energy into enterprise, namely the idea of a “basic income”. Suffi-
cient thought is now being given at national and regional governmental levels that
it is beginning to be tentatively applied in practice for the first time since the Lev-
ellers and Diggers. Such is the vast burden of public expenditure occasioned by
the huge weight of healthcare and welfare services and the armies of public ser-
vants that administer what can amount to 40 % + of national GDP that conditions
are becoming appropriate to consider “basic income” for all citizens. Keep in mind
the proposed Swiss monthly stipend is £1,700 ($2,400) paid to every citizen, a rate
of £20,400 ($28,000). The Swiss health and welfare (including administration)
budget Adult citizen population is 4.8 million. Swiss GDP in 2016 was $475 billion
(PPP); Health and Welfare GDP is 36 %. Thus approximately $171 billion of GDP
is spent on Health and Welfare. This compares with $140 billion in proposed Basic
Income, a rough saving per annum of $31 billion to Swiss taxpayers. Some portion
of this is private expenditure but even so, with two-thirds devoted to social secur-
ity, public expenditure is substantial. The point here is that a surge of enterprise
formation could be expected from these Health and Welfare ecosystems, which can
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be expected to be dynamic, interactive, efficient and effective enterprises despite
inevitable start-up and even maturer failures.
Finally, “variety” especially “related variety” (including “revealed related variety”) in
respect of “enterprise ecosystems” having been specified in terms of search, selection
and structuring of enterprise potential in relation to ecosystem opportunities, offers a
new and more “path-creating” trajectory of new and diversified business opportunity
than more “path dependent” ways of thinking about entrepreneurship. In relation to
the separate and distinctive but innovation-directed systems with which future, struc-
tured enterprise ecosystems (EE) may come to interact, the RIS and EE joint model
offers a powerful conceptual and practical framework for purposive action. In “grand
challenge” contexts like “ageing”, “healthcare surges” and “ambient assisted living” each
of which place enormous burdens on taxpayer resources and public investment, there
could be no better global scale experiment upon which to begin evolving tools for com-
plexity in both RIS and EE. Accordingly, with the latter even closer to the patient-
provider interface than the RIS perspective, the interesting idea of “enterprise ecosys-
tems” or, if preferred “entrepreneurial ecosystems” further underlines the potential of
new opportunities for developing not only the “virtues” but the “value of variety”.
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